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defensible, and if the implications
sketched here are compelling, it sug-
gests that the categorization of theo-
retical perspectives into hard and soft
and the characterization of non-
positivists as negativist (with its
historical connotations) are mislead-
ing, are barriers to serious discussion
between alternatives, and ought to be
abandoned. For those terms are tied
to a period when the rationality of
political inquiry was considered to be
less problematic and faith in the
hard-positivist mode of analysis less
questioned and less questionable.
The current potential for theo-
retical pluralism in political science
holds the promise of lively debate
among competing theoretical perspec-
tives. The development of that theo-
retical pluralism would undoubtedly
open up new terrain, generate new
issues, and recast old ones. Political
science would be impoverished if this
potential were unintentionally short-
circuited by the adherence to a
vocabulary that inaccurately pre-
defines the issues and falsely preju-
dices the alternatives.
tion of foundations per se. But most post-
empiricists/post-positivists have accepted
post-foundationalism as well. Hence, I have
focused on a version of post-empiricism/
post-positivism that does have an anti-
foundationalist thrust to it.
It should also be clear that on this reading
post-positivism is incompatible with the
orthodox versions of Marxism with which
Almond groups it.
Note
1. I should point out here that post-
empiricism does not necessarily entail a rejec-
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Recently, there has been much dis-
cussion in the profession about why
rational choice theorists do what they
do. Gabriel A. Almond (1988a, 835)
is troubled by the way many of them
preempt "the badge of professional-
ism and (by) their demotion of the
rest of us to a prescientific status."
David McKay (1988, 1054) wonders
why there are so many rational
choice theorists in the United States
and not in Europe.
Authors such as Almond and
McKay take the behavior of rational
choice theorists as dependent varia-
ble, the phenomenon they wish to
explain. In the present essay I reverse
the question, making the behavior of
rational choice theorists my inde-
pendent variable. I am interested in
the question of how the teaching of
rational choice theories to our stu-
dents influences their political views
and perhaps in the long term the
political culture at large. This is a
special question within a much
broader problem, namely how teach-
ing political science influences the
political life of a country. My general
point is that we need theories to
explain how the teaching of our
theories affect political reality. It is
not sufficient for political scientists
to explain political life, we must also
consider how these explanations,
through our teaching, affect political
life. But why focus on rational
choice theories? As the essay will
quickly reveal, its writing has been
driven by a specific worry. But I
hope that the example of rational
choice theories will allow me to make
a more general point.
Within rational choice theories my
worry focuses on a specific subgroup
whom I label, for the lack of a better
term, hard-line rational choice theo-
rists. They assume that voters and
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Rational Choice Theories and Politics
politicians are utility maximizers in a
very narrow sense and, directly or
indirectly, imply that this assumption
is descriptively accurate and even
normatively appropriate. Voters, in
choosing among candidates, look in
an egotistical way for their material
self-interest. Politicians, equally self-
ishly, are motivated to be elected and
reelected. Rational choice theories
may be based on other motives in-
cluding motives of morality and
altruism. The assumption may also
be made as a purely heuristic device
to simplify the initial formulation of
a problem. In these cases I am not
worried about the consequences of
teaching rational choice theories. My
concern focuses on theories which
are based on the axiom of a narrow-
ly conceived and materially oriented
egoism, especially if in the course of
one's research this axiom is never
seriously challenged. Almond (1988b)
calls this "core" rational choice
theory; in my view, "hard-line"
rational choice theory may give a
more appropriate connotation. For
an entire generation of hard-line
rational choice theorists William H.
Riker (1962, 22) has formulated the
basic axiom in a very concise way:
"Politically rational man is the man
who would rather win than lose,
regardless of the particular stakes."
Thus, winning is always better than
losing; staying in office better than
being thrown out of office; a higher
office better than a lower one. Look-
ing through the current journals it is
not difficult to identify articles by
rational choice theorists who work
with the assumption that politicians
maximize their election chances. A
typical example is an article by David
Austen-Smith and Jeffrey Banks in
the June 1988 issue of the American
Political Science Review where the
authors build a model based on the
axiom that "rational candidates"
select "their electoral strategy and
subsequent legislative behavior condi-
tional on electoral success" (Austen-
Smith and Banks, 1988, 405). Thus
winning seems to be everything.
Legislative behavior is oriented
towards future elections.
If we teach our students that this
is the premise which allows us best to
explain the behavior of politicians,
some of our most sensitive students
may be shocked and repulsed by this
view of politics as an essentially self-
ish enterprise. They may deny that
this accurately describes the world in
which we live. But many students,
impressed by the professional author-
ity of their teachers, will blindly
accept the explanation. For these stu-
dents it is then a small step to con-
found explanation with justification.
What can be explained, must some-
how also be justified. If, indeed, the
premise that politicians are primarily
motivated in gaining and keeping
political office corresponds to some
kind of natural law, then one has to
accept and live with this state of
nature.
Whether these speculations about
the consequences of teaching hard-
It is puzzling that we as
a profession hardly ever
study the effect of our
teaching on our students
and through them on the
political life of the country
at large.
line rational choice theories actually
correspond to reality, is in principle
open to empirical research. It is puz-
zling that we as a profession hardly
ever study the effect of our teaching
on our students and through them on
the political life of the country at
large. In trying to explain political
life, political scientists touch on vir-
tually all aspects of society, not only
on the polity, but also on what hap-
pens in families, schools, churches,
the media, the work place, during
leisure time, etc. What we strangely
ignore is what happens in political
science itself. Do we not expect that
our teaching will in some way shape
the political views of our students in
later life? Will it not make a dif-
ference for the political orientation
of our students whether we teach
them Immanuel Kant, Jiirgen Haber-
mas or rational choice theory? Are
we not aware that we are not only
observers but, through our research
and teaching, also actors in the polit-
ical life of a country? This essay
wishes to remind us that we have not
only professional but also political
responsibilities. If we undertake a
major reorientation in our profes-
sion, we should also consider its
political implications. And the
emergence of rational choice theories
in the last ten to twenty years is
indeed a major reorientation of our
discipline. If we assume that in an
ultimate sense political science should
help to improve political life (e.g.,
Huntington, 1988), then, of course,
we should be interested in the polit-
ical implications of such a reorienta-
tion in our profession. This, of
course, should be true for any
reorientation. Thus, when in the
1960s many American political scien-
tists turned to a structural-functional-
ist approach, the political implica-
tions of this reorientation should also
have been considered, which they
were not.
To consider the political implica-
tions of one's research and teaching
is important for any academic disci-
pline, and many such as biology and
physics do indeed make such efforts.
Why not political science? Quite
ironically, it seems that with our
research tools we should be the disci-
pline best equipped to investigate the
pohtical implications of our research
and teaching activities. In this essay,
I wish to describe to what specific
research agenda such an inquiry may
lead and what moral questions we
will have to confront.
A first empirically testable hypoth-
esis was already mentioned, namely
that the explanations of hard-line
rational choice theories tend to be
perceived by students not merely as
explanations but also as justifica-
tions. As Murray Edelman (1988,
1337) argues, "(i)f language is a
political weapon, the language of
social science has proven an especial-
ly effective one and never more so
than when it claimed to be profes-
sional, analytic, and scientific." To
study whether the highly formalized
language of hard-line rational choice
theories has also a normative effect
on the students exposed to these
theories, standard research tech-
niques can be used. One would have
to compare student classes where
hard-line rational choice theories are
taught with control groups without
any exposure to these theories. There
is already an interesting research
March 1990 47
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The Profession
finding relevant in this context.
Experiments conducted by Gerald
Marwell and Ruth Ames (1981)
revealed that graduate students in
economics free ride more often than
other students. Could the reason be
that the theories taught in economics
are so much based on material self
interest?
In longitudinal studies one would
have to investigate to what extent the
differences that are found endure or
dissipate over time. It would be par-
ticularly important to pursue students
who later become journalists because
they have to interpret politics for the
general public. Do journalists trained
in hard-line rational choice theories
interpret the news differently from
their colleagues without such train-
ing? Let us take as an illustration
reporting about the problem of the
homeless. Journalists who had their
training not in hard-line rational
choice theories but, for example, in
Kantian philosophy could be ex-
pected to interpret the problem of
the homeless in terms of the duties
of society. Those with Marxist train-
ing would tend to interpret the prob-
lem in terms of class struggle. How
about journalists with a thorough
training in hard-line rational choice
theories? I hypothesize that they
would primarily ask whether tackling
or not tackling the problem of the
homeless is likely to affect the elec-
tion chances of various groups of
politicians. Interpreting the news in
this framework would help to rein-
force the perceptions of politics held
by readers and voters trained in
hard-line rational choice theories.
Such journalists would help these
voters to maintain the views learned
way back in their political science
classes. As a real-life illustration
which nicely fits in this context, I
wish to mention the four-hour-long
television show "The Power Game,"
narrated by Hedrick Smith and aired
by PBS January 2-5, 1989. This
show made in a powerful way and
with sophisticated tools the point
that in the power game in Washing-
ton winning is everything.
How would politicians behave in
an environment dominated by jour-
nalists and voters trained in hard-line
rational choice theories, especially if
they themselves had training in these
theories? Three aspects come to mind
concerning the time perspective of
their decisions, the voters they con-
sider in their decisions, and the pro-
grams they favor. (1) Politicians
would have a relatively short time
perspective because the next election
is always just around the corner. If
the issue were, for example, to
reduce the parking space in a city so
that in the long-term interest of the
environment private traffic would be
discouraged, these politicians would
hardly be in favor of the policy. The
benefits of such a measure would lie
far in the future and it would also be
unclear from which voters exactly, if
any, these politicians could ever
expect any rewards. On the other
hand, quick punishment in the next
election from automobile lobbies
would be virtually certain. We must
also consider that voters would
expect that their individualistic self
interests be fulfilled by politicians.
The voters would ask how they
profit if they vote for a particular
politician. Arguments involving duty
for the well-being of future genera-
tions would find little fertile ground
among politicians and voters alike.
The logic of the situation would be
for politicians to do what pays off
best at the next election, because
according to the teaching of hard-line
rational choice theories winning is
always better than losing. Everything
else would appear as irrational, a
point explicitly made by Riker (1962,
22) who states: "Unquestionably
there are guilt-ridden and shame-
conscious men who do not desire to
win, who in fact desire to lose. These
are the irrational ones of politics."
The time horizon of politicians can
be somewhat expanded if the axiom
of rational choice theorists is not
merely a win in the next election but
as many electoral wins as possible.
Under this assumption it may be
rational to risk a loss in the election
immediately ahead if this could
increase the electoral chances in later
elections. This added sophistication
helps with some of the problems of a
short time perspective, but winning
still remains everything, although in
a longer time perspective. But even
with this approach the problem of a
really long time perspective beyond
the political careers of current politi-
cians is not addressed. And many
issues, such as the environment and
social security, must be seen in these
long time perspectives.
(2) I would also expect that the
needs of small unorganized groups
with limited financial resources
would hardly be considered because
they cannot deliver anything worth-
while for elections. This need not be
the case in all environments. Take
the example of Swiss mountain farm-
ers who are few in number, not par-
ticularly well organized, and certainly
without large financial resources.
Yet, their needs are usually quite well
taken care of in the Swiss parliament
where programs are often passed
because they benefit a weak or mar-
ginal group (Steiner, 1974). Argu-
ments rooted in duty and altruism
are effectively brought into play in
such situations. I do not wish to
argue, of course, that mountain
farmers are treated quite generously
in Swiss politics because hard-line
rational choice theories are hardly
taught at Swiss universities. Causality
is rather the other way around:
Given the significantly less individ-
ualistic and more communal culture
of Swiss society, its universities are
not receptive to the introduction of
courses in hard-line rational choice
theories. But if the teaching of these
theories were to spread in the future,
electorally ineffective groups would
be more hard pressed in Swiss poli-
tics. Purely electoral considerations
would become stronger compared
with motives of communal solidarity.
(3) Still another consequence could
be that political programs would
greatly emphasize tangible over in-
tangible goods. Being accustomed to
cost-benefit analyses directing their
behavior, both politicians and voters
would prefer that the goods delivered
by the government be expressed in
numerical terms because this makes
them more easily comparable: so
much cash subsidies for this group,
so many miles of new roads for this
other group. Closing a street in the
inner city for private cars, on the
other hand, would have little attrac-
tion because the pleasure of pedestri-
ans to stroll leisurely along the entire
street can be expressed in numerical
terms only with great difficulties, if
at all.
In summary, I expect that in an
environment dominated by hard-line
rational choice theories political deci-
48 PS: Political Science & Politics
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Rational Choice Theories and Politics
sions would tend to be made with a
short time perspective, to neglect
electorally ineffective voters, and to
place greater emphasis on tangible
rather than on intangible policy pro-
grams. How can these hypotheses be
tested? The task is more difficult
than with the hypotheses discussed
earlier which involve individual stu-
dents and journalists as units of
analysis. Here the units of analysis
are decision cases. One way to pro-
ceed would be to distinguish for each
decision case whether and to what
extent the participating actors had
any training in hard-line rational
choice theories. One could then
investigate whether this variation had
any influence on the characteristics
of the decision process and its out-
come (for an approach using decision
cases as units of analysis see Dorff
and Steiner, 1987).
If political scientists wish to sys-
tematically study the political impli-
cations of the reorientation of their
discipline towards hard-line rational
choice theories, this would mean a
major research endeavor. This essay
is a plea to the profession to engage
in such research. If we believe that
our research and teaching has any
political relevance, then we should be
concerned with precisely what this
relevance is. If we undertake a major
intellectual reorientation we should
carefully consider the possible impact
of such a reorientation on the polit-
ical life of the country. More gen-
erally speaking, we have an obliga-
tion to consider the consequences of
whatever we teach students in polit-
ical science classes. In this essay I
focus on hard-line rational choice
theories, but in principle the argu-
ments would apply to any subfield of
the discipline. Thus, we should be
concerned, for example, how psycho-
logically and sociologically based vot-
ing studies affect our students,
especially if they go into careers such
as campaign managing, polling,
political advertisement. To what
extent will they use the acquired
knowledge to manipulate voters and
thus to hurt the democratic quality
of the country?
With regard to the reorientation
towards hard-line rational choice
theories, the debate can and should
begin even before the research
agenda outlined in this paper is
implemented. For the time being, the
basis can be educated guesses which
later can be based on firmer ground
as research results come in.
To get the discussion rolling, and
assuming that the hypotheses pre-
sented in this essay are not complete-
ly off the mark, I venture to express
the opinion that the widespread
teaching of hard-line rational choice
theories may have negative conse-
quences for American society if this
teaching is not embedded in a
broader philosophical framework.
This opinion is, of course, anchored
in a particular value premise, namely
that in American society the individ-
ualistic pursuit of material goods has
been taken to an unhealthy extreme.
There is too much emphasis on the
question: "What is in it for me?"
There is too much emphasis on win-
ning, to be number one, to kill the
other guy, at least in a figurative
sense. Americans learn as early as in
little league football that winning is
everything, that, cheered on by their
parents, they have to go for the kill.
Later on, they encounter the same
expectation everywhere in society: in
the business world, in politics, and
even in academia. What touchdowns
were in little league football, profits
become in the business world, polit-
ical offices in politics, publications
and citations in academia. The name
of the game is to accumulate as
many of these trophies as possible.
This is closely related to the strange
American fascination with statistics
of comparative standing: Who is in
the top ten percent of the class? Who
is the top coach in the country, the
top governor, the teacher of the
year?
There are costs to this extreme
competitiveness, such as stress-
induced mental and physical illnesses,
perhaps corruption, perhaps an
aggressive foreign policy. The teach-
ing of hard-line rational choice
theories may further reinforce the
competitive nature of American soci-
ety. Many of my colleagues see
nothing wrong with this. For them
competition is the core of human
nature, and therefore, the more of it
the better. According to this view
competition is the essential pleasure
of life. Many Americans are dis-
mayed to hear that in a country like
Switzerland business cartels are legal
and all major parties share power in
the executive cabinet. If one is accus-
tomed to competition, such a culture
may appear dull and stifling, and to
a certain extent it is.
My point is certainly not that the
teaching of hard-line rational choice
theories should be reduced. But as
teachers we should be much more
aware of the political implications of
this teaching, and for that matter, of
any teaching. Political implications
are much less apparent if an ap-
proach to knowledge helps to rein-
force the status quo, but there are
political implications nevertheless.
When hard-line rational choice
theories are taught, students should
be told in a very explicit way that
these theories may explain how many
current politicians behave but not
necessarily how they should behave.
If they were taught in such a norma-
tive context, I have no objection at
all against the teaching of hard-line
rational choice theories. On the con-
trary, such teaching may allow the
students to begin to reflect how
important a value competition really
is in their society and whether win-
ning should be indeed everything in
politics. They will be led to ponder
the moral question whether someone
like William A. Galston (1988, 1281,
1284) is right when he postulates vir-
tues that "are not reducible to self-
interest" and rejects "any compre-
hensive egoism." For Galston, liberal
citizenship is not "simply the pursuit
of self-interest." Politicians are
warned not to pursue winning at any
price and "to resist the temptation to
earn popularity by pandering to im-
moderate public demands."
I wish to end with Amitai Etzioni
(1989) who complains exactly along
the line of the present paper that
"through textbooks, neoclassicists
teach millions of high-school and col-
lege students every year a model that,
as the economist Robert Solow puts
it, 'underplays the significance of
ethical judgments.' "
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Political Science and the 21st Century:
From Government to Governance
William W. Boyer, University of Delaware
Years ago when I was teaching at
Kansas State University, a Professor
of Horticulture confronted me with
the question: "You say you are a
political scientist. . . . tell me, what
is scientific about politics?" I
retorted: "Well, what is cultural
about horticulture?"
What Is Political Science?
This exchange did provoke me to
give much more thought to what is
political science. Stuart Chase has
stated that the test of a scientist is
the ability to predict with accuracy
(Chase, 1948: ch. 17). Surely, by this
standard, political science is not very
scientific. And there is a lack of gen-
eral agreement as to the scope of our
discipline.'
Nevertheless, there is one funda-
mental concept I believe that does
serve to give some unity to political
science, and that is the concept of
"power" (Robson, 1954: 17). So,
when I am asked what is political
science, I say that it is above all the
study of "power" in society. Then, I
proceed to define power as the
capacity to allocate resources. I
explain that political scientists are
interested in all questions relating to
power: who has power, how power is
acquired, how it is exercised, how it
is transferred, how it is lost, etc.—or
who gets what, when and how. Then
I say that political scientists are inter-
ested in the study of any institution
in society that exercises power: the
school, church, labor union, busi-
ness, government.
I then elaborate: of all institutions
that allocate resources—or have
power—we are interested primarily in
government,2 because government is
the most powerful and coercive insti-
tution in society. And since govern-
ment organizes the nation-state, we
also study the nation-state as the
context in which government exists.
And we therefore also study the rela-
tions between and among nation-
states (and particularly their govern-
ments) and this we call international
relations.
I suspect few political scientists
would disagree with this logic. It is
my contention, however, that this
conception of political science is
becoming obsolete and will no longer
serve us as well as we enter the last
decade of the 20th century and pre-
pare our students for the 21st
century.
Momentous World Change
Although social scientists need to
rethink the concept of power (Bould-
ing, 1989), we political scientists need
not abandon our concern with this
concept as providing the central unity
of our discipline. I do argue, how-
ever, that governments of, within,
and between nation-states should no
longer command such an exclusive
hold on our attention. We need to
shift more attention from govern-
ment to governance. Why gover-
nance? Let me explain.
We humans are in the midst of
momentous world change wrought
by revolutionary advances in science
and technology. Ours is a time of
"macrotransition," but, whatever
label we affix to it, accelerating
world change has created an inter-
dependent global environment, a
fragile, vulnerable global system, of
which all of us are a part (Cleveland,
1980; Boyer, 1986).
Ours is a time of: a world teetering
on the brink of ecological disaster;
the persistence of mass poverty and
hunger; the depletion of nonrenew-
able fuel and energy; death control
surpassing birth control; exploding
populations and scarce resources; oil
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